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To Sell or Not to Sell, That Is the Question: 
The Rescission of Sale on the Basis of Lesion and Its 
Applicability to Mineral Rights
I. A BRIEF INSIGHT–
LESION, MINERALS, AND THE PROBLEMS WITHIN
One of the most sacred possessions held by man is his property.1
Imagine that you own a tract of land. After much contemplation, you 
decide to sell this tract for $28,000. A short time after completion of this 
sale, you are informed that the purchaser discovered significant amounts 
of gravel beneath the surface of the tract. This gravel is valued at 
approximately $100,000.00, nearly four times the original selling price. 
Objectively, it looks like a bad deal. You may be thinking that you have
just been scammed; you are likely angry that you lost out on a fortune. Is 
there anything you can do?
The above facts simulate the issue in Hornsby v. Slade,2 where Ms. 
Hornsby filed suit to set aside the sale of a certain tract of land because of 
lesion beyond moiety.3 Similar to Ms. Hornsby, your immediate reaction 
may be to file suit against the purchaser. Do you have a cause of action to 
file such a suit? This article delves into that issue. 
One course of action in such a scenario is found within the Louisiana 
Civil Code, which establishes a cause of action for lesion beyond moiety.4
Lesion beyond moiety is the act of an individual rescinding the sale of an 
immovable on the basis of lesion due to the price being less than one-half 
of the fair market value of that immovable.5 Only the seller can claim 
                                                                                                            
Copyright 2017, by DAKOTA HAWKINS.
1. See James Madison, Property, Papers 14:266-68 (1792). 
2. Hornsby v. Slade, 854 So. 2d 441 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
3. Id. at 442. The sale of an immovable may be rescinded for lesion when 
the price is less than one half of the fair market value of the immovable. Lesion
can be claimed only by the seller and only in sales of corporeal immovables. It 
cannot be alleged in a sale made by order of the court. The seller may invoke
lesion even if he has renounced the right to claim it. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 
(2017) (emphasis added). The definition of moiety is commonly referred to as “a
half of something.” Moiety, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017). Lesion is defined as “[l]oss from 
another’s failure to perform a contract” or “the injury suffered by one who did not 
receive the equivalent value of what was bargained for.” Lesion, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017). 
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lesion in the sale of corporeal immovables, such as land.6 Lesion cannot 
be alleged in a sale made by order of the court. The seller may invoke 
lesion even if he has renounced the right to claim it.7 Additionally, parties 
giving corporeal immovables in exchange8 may demand the value of the 
thing from which he was evicted or the return of the thing he gave, with 
damages available as awarded in either case.9
Unfortunately, your question does not have a straightforward answer.
The Louisiana Civil Code allows rescission on the grounds of lesion 
beyond moiety.10 However, under the Louisiana Mineral Code, the sale of 
a mineral right is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.11 To 
address the obvious legislative conflict, the Mineral Code provides that in 
the event of any conflict between the provisions of the Mineral Code and 
any provision of the Civil Code, the provisions of the Mineral Code will 
prevail.12
While a literal reading would show that the Mineral Code’s preclusion 
applies only to mineral rights as a simple exception to the Louisiana Civil 
Code’s allowance of lesionary actions, perhaps Mineral Code article 17 
should not only apply to mineral interests, but also land sales functioning 
practically the same as the sale of a mineral interest. Consider a situation 
where the value of a piece of land is an absolute zero. If that piece of land 
is sold for a value according to the value given to the minerals beneath, 
but the contract terms only express the sale of the land itself with the 
underlying motive of the value of the minerals, the differing code articles 
provide differing solutions with a meritless economic distinction. 
Regarding the sale of a tract of land, the sale of all rights is included 
with the land, unless clearly separated in an instrument. Therefore, it is 
necessary to draw a teleological extension from the legislative purpose in 
applying Mineral Code article 17 not only to mineral rights, but also to the 
sale of land functioning practically the same as the sale of the mineral 
interest. Courts have avoided such a necessary extension thus far;
                                                                                                            
6. Id. “[T]here are only two kinds of immovables: corporeal immovables 
and incorporeal immovables. Corporeal immovables are tracts of land with their 
component parts . . . . “ A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE:
PROPERTY § 7:8 (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter YIANNOPOULOS, TREATISE].
7. Id.
8. “Exchange is a contract whereby each party transfers to the other the 
ownership of a thing other than money.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2660 (2017).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2662 (2017).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
12. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2 (1975).
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however, it is crucial to the proper application of the differing lesion 
articles within the Civil and Mineral Codes.
So, turning back to the original hypothetical, is your cause of action 
precluded by the Mineral Code? Perhaps not. The current jurisprudential 
interpretation of the application of lesion pertaining to minerals is unclear;
Louisiana courts both preclude and allow successful actions for lesion 
beyond moiety pertaining to minerals found beneath land post-sale.13
These jurisprudential inconsistencies may allow claimants a method of 
circumventing the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion beyond moiety. 
This article will discuss how these inconsistencies can be resolved through 
a hybrid approach drawn from the foundational case pertaining to this 
issue, Wilkins v. Nelson. Thereafter, it will discuss the subsequent Hornsby 
v. Slade dissenting opinion and propose a practical application drawn from 
the case that exemplifies how the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion 
pertaining to mineral rights should be applied.14 An examination of 
Louisiana cases pertaining to lesion beyond moiety reveals the need for a 
new application of the law that will clarify the jurisprudential disparities.
Part II of this article will provide the historical background of lesion 
for a better understanding of the historically different applications of 
lesion, including and explaining all relevant legislation, language, and 
methodologies. Part III will discuss the issues presented by notable cases 
and discussions surrounding rescission based on lesion pertaining to 
minerals. Finally, Part IV will propose an analytical framework detailing 
how the differing coded lesion articles should be applied when an action 
based on lesion beyond moiety is brought. 
II. A LOOK INTO THE PAST:
THE CIVIL LAW, THE MINERAL CODE, AND SURROUNDING POLICIES
[F]or over eighty years, it has been the law of Louisiana that a sale 
of mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the 
terms of the law which affords relief on the score of lesion; its 
inherent nature and character being such as not to be susceptible 
of having an intrinsic definite and fixable value.’15
                                                                                                            
13. It is important to note that the Louisiana Law Institute formed a 
committee in 2016 to answer the questions raised by this article, chaired by 
Professor John Trahan, faculty of the Paul M. Hebert Louisiana State University 
Law Center.
14. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 446 (McClendon, J., dissenting).
15. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Properties, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 
(W.D. La. 2009) (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 608 (La. 1924)).
276 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
While a straightforward reading of this statement appears to set a firm 
legal principle, Louisiana courts’ recent analyses vary greatly as to 
whether lesion beyond moiety should be applied to the sale of minerals. It 
is unclear why such an inconsistency has developed; however, one may 
consider the limited amount of legal scholarship available to the courts 
pertaining to this area, in conjunction with the low volume of jurisprudence 
to draw from, in understanding the numerous applications for lesion 
pertaining to minerals.
A. The Prevailing Law
Louisiana’s legal system is civilian, based heavily on its French and 
Spanish heritage which prioritizes legislation above judge-made law. The 
Louisiana Civil Code states in its first article that the sources of law in 
Louisiana are legislation and custom.16 In the absence of legislation or 
custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity.17 Even where a 
court proceeds according to equity, that single decision is not considered 
binding upon later courts, because Louisiana does not recognize the doctrine
of stare decisis.18 Instead, a long line of judicial decisions may be 
considered mere guidance for the courts to follow according to the doctrine 
of jurisprudence constante.19
The guiding statutory provisions pertaining to lesion are drawn from 
the Louisiana Civil Code and the Mineral Code. The phrase “lesion 
beyond moiety” stems from the Latin laesio enormis, a legal doctrine 
developed according to the ideals of “just price” found in the Corpus Juris 
Civilis.20 The Civil Code’s lesion article specifically applies only to those 
things considered corporeal immovables.21
In Louisiana, things are divided into common, public, and private
things; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables and immovables.22
Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate, and 
                                                                                                            
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2017).
18. See Ardoin v. Hartford Acc’t & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La. 
1978); Carter v. Moore, 248 So. 2d 921, 959 (1971); Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury 
Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216, 218 (1970), overruled on other grounds.
19. See Heinick v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 701 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (La. Ct. 
App. 1997); City of New Orleans v. Treen, 421 So. 2d 282, 285 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
20. DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE: SALES § 13:3 (2017).
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2017).
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can be felt or touched.23 Incorporeals are things that have no body but are 
comprehended by understanding. Rights of inheritance, servitudes, 
obligations, and rights of intellectual property are incorporeal things.24 Tracts 
of land, with their component parts, are immovables.25 Importantly, mineral 
rights are not considered component parts of tracts of land but are rather 
considered incorporeal immovables.26
To establish a cause of action for lesion, the immovable sold must be 
evaluated according to the condition in which it was at the time of the 
sale.27 If a sale is deemed to be lesionary, the buyer has two choices: (1) 
return the immovable to the seller, or (2) keep the immovable and give the 
seller a supplement equal to the difference between the price paid and the 
fair market value.28 The action for lesion must be brought within a 
peremptive period of one year from the time of the sale.29
Conversely, the Mineral Code provides that the sale of a mineral right 
may not be rescinded based on lesion beyond moiety.30 In the 1924 case 
Wilkins v. Nelson, the Louisiana Supreme Court established that the 
Louisiana Civil Code article for lesion does not apply to mineral interests.31
This decision was later codified into the current Louisiana Mineral Code 
article 17, which precludes lesion for mineral rights.32 Herein lies a major 
disparity among the Codes. 
Mineral Code article 4 states that the Code “is applicable to all forms of 
minerals, including oil and gas.” The Code is also “applicable to rights to 
explore for or mine or remove from land the soil itself, gravel, shells, 
subterranean water, or other substances occurring naturally in or as a part of 
the soil or geological formations on or underlying the land.”33 The Mineral 
                                                                                                            
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2017).
24. Id.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 462 (2017). Buildings, other constructions permanently 
attached to the ground, standing timber, and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits 
of trees, are component parts of a tract of land when they belong to the owner of the 
ground. LA. CIV. CODE art. 463 (2017). 
26. Rights and actions that apply to immovable things are incorporeal 
immovables. Immovables of this kind are such as personal servitudes established 
on immovables, predial servitudes, mineral rights, and petitory or possessory 
actions. LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2017).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2590 (2017).
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2591 (2017).
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2595 (2017).
30. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
31. 99 So. 607 (La. 1924).
32. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:17 (1975).
33. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4 (1975).
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Code does not attempt a firm definition of the term “minerals;” however, 
the comment to article 4 provides some guidance:
The purpose of including oil and gas within the meaning of the term 
minerals is solely to indicate the applicability of the code to those 
substances and has no relationship whatsoever to the problem of 
construing particular conveyances to determine whether specific 
substances are included or excluded from the terms of an 
instrument. Insofar as construction of instruments for this purpose 
is concerned, the Supreme Court has stated in Holloway Gravel Co. 
v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 925, 9 So. 2d 228, 231 (1942), that the 
term “mineral” is not a definite one . . . but is susceptible of 
limitation according to the intention of the parties using it and in 
determining its meaning, regard must be had not only to the 
language of the deed in which it occurs, but also to the relative 
positions of the parties interested and to the substance of the 
transaction which the deed embodies.34
A focus on the particularity required by the legislature of the property sold 
being a corporeal immovable, the fact that the right to produce minerals is 
considered an incorporeal, and how such applications should be 
interpreted and applied to the sale of minerals is crucial to determining 
whether there is a cause of action for lesion.
B. The Lack of Guidance from Secondary Sources 
Jurisprudence in Louisiana is considered a secondary source of law, 
following the primary sources of law: legislation and custom.35 Therefore, 
jurisprudence and doctrine may guide a court in reaching a decision only 
in the absence of legislation and custom. As the legislation in this area 
appears contradictory, our attention must turn to the jurisprudence available.
The study of lesion beyond moiety pertaining to minerals has been 
neglected within the civilian legal field, specifically with reference to the 
inconsistencies within this line of jurisprudence. The most applicable 
secondary source to this discussion is Patrick H. Martin’s Louisiana Mineral 
Law Treatise;36 however, the treatise contains a mere four paragraphs, 
which are not helpful in interpreting the proper application as set by the 
Louisiana courts. This short rendition discusses the preclusion of a 
                                                                                                            
34. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4 cmt. (1975).
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
36. PATRICK H. MARTIN, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE (2012). 
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lesionary action according to the Mineral Code, supporting a bar on the 
speculative value of mineral rights.37
While this short statement is a proper beginning to the analysis, the 
treatise moves away from proper application by providing Thomas v. Pride 
Oil & Gas Properties, Inc. as an illustration, a case that instead focused on 
misrepresentations and fiduciary duties surrounding the sale of mineral 
rights.38 These pages lack guidance of the proper application of rescission 
for mineral discovery on the basis of lesion. 
Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos provides that “Louisiana courts have 
allowed the action for lesion beyond moiety in connection with the sales of 
immovables by nature or destination, but have refused to allow it in cases 
involving sale of mineral interests.”39 While this statement is factually 
correct, it is outdated and recent jurisprudence has upset this once-settled 
premise.
III. THE CURRENT CONFUSING CASE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO LESION ACTIONS FOR MINERALS
Multiple applications, interpretations, and conclusions of the law 
pertaining to rescission based on lesion beyond moiety may be drawn from 
the select cases that have made their way through the Louisiana court 
system. While each case on its own may not provide an accurate depiction 
of the law, when explained and picked apart according to civilian legal 
principles derived from the Civil Code and the Mineral Code, the cases 
provide a workable framework for future application.
A. Wilkins v. Nelson (1924)
The foundational case for the issue of lesion in the context of mineral
sales is Wilkins v. Nelson, where the Louisiana Supreme Court determined 
that when the Louisiana Civil Code “restricted the action of lesion to 
immovables, it meant immovables which are such by their nature and not 
such as are made immovables by disposition of the law.”40 The question of 
whether the preclusion of an action for lesion to immovables in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1862 applied to minerals arose when J.D. Wilkins 
commenced an action for rescission on the basis of lesion beyond moiety to 
                                                                                                            
37. Id. at 88.
38. Id. at 89.
39. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and 
Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 555 (1962) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, 
Movables].
40. See Wilkins, 99 So. at 608 (emphasis added).
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set aside a sale of all of the oil, gas, and minerals in, to, and under 120 acres 
of land situated in the Parish of Ouachita.41
The sale at issue was executed between J.D. Wilkins and Oscar Nelson
for $900 cash and one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil produced or 
saved from the tract of land.42 Mr. Wilkins alleged that the mineral rights 
on and under the land were worth $50,000 but that he was ignorant of this 
fact at the time of the sale and had no experience in land development or 
minerals, unlike Mr. Nelson, who had spent his entire life doing such 
work.43
The Court relied on two separate rationales to determine that the 
lesionary action was properly precluded: 
First, because the thing, the subject of the sale, cannot be regarded 
as one falling within the terms of the law which affords relief on the 
score of lesion; its inherent nature and character being such as not 
to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable value.
Second, because the plaintiff’s petition alleges that his vendee had 
parted with all of his interest in the mineral rights to a third party.44
Focusing on the first sentence, the Court reiterated the well-established rule 
of law that ownership of land does not include a separate and distinct 
ownership of those minerals beneath the land, but that the landowner has the 
right to explore for and reduce those minerals to possession and ownership.45
In conveying the right to Nelson, “no title of ownership to any specific thing, 
separate and distinct from the soil” was transferred, “but merely the right to 
drill and capture, and reduce to possession such quantities of the oil and gas 
as might be found under the ground.”46 The Court determined such a transfer 
is most similar to a transfer of a real or incorporeal right, such as the right 
of servitude.47
The Court opined that although servitudes are considered immovables 
under the Louisiana Civil Code, “it by no means follows that such a 
                                                                                                            
41. Id. Note that in 1924, Louisiana Civil Code article 1862 was the current 
article pertaining to the application of lesion. Lesion can be alleged by persons of 
full age in no other sale than one for immovables, in which is included whatever 
is immovable by destination.
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. Defendant transferred his rights in the property to Cosmos Carbon 
Company, which happened to be his own company, not at issue for this article’s
purposes.
45. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:5-31:6 (1975).
46. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608.
47. Id.
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servitude as here involved which is also declared to be a real and incorporeal 
right – is to be regarded as an immovable in the sense in which the word 
immovable is used in article 1861 of the code.”48 The Court stated that it 
was established long ago that not “every kind of immovable is brought 
under or falls within the terms of the article conferring the action of lesion 
upon a vendor.”49
In its decision, the Court emphasized the words “speculative” and 
“intangible,” counter to “fixed” and “dependable,” stating that an opposite 
view would provide the seller with a win-win situation, in effect, placing 
the entirety of the risk upon the buyer.50 The Court stated, “Had there been 
no gas found in the land in question the plaintiff would doubtless have 
been perfectly satisfied with the cash price he received, but, gas having 
been discovered, he now seeks an additional profit.”51
The Wilkins Court’s interpretation precludes the action of lesion to 
mineral rights that are deemed incorporeal immovables.52 Fifty years later, 
in 1974, the Wilkins rule was codified into Louisiana Mineral Code article 
17, supra.53 However, since Wilkins,54 lower Louisiana courts have taken 
multiple approaches on the issue of how minerals should be considered in 
an action for lesion beyond moiety, moving distinctly away from this 
overarching ruling.
B. Hornsby v. Slade (2003)
In 2003, the First Circuit Court of Appeal chose to steer away from 
the nearly eighty-year-old jurisprudence. The court upheld a district court 
decision that “the value of sand and gravel or solid mineral deposits in the 
land sold could be considered in determining the fair market value of the 
land and, thus, subject the sale to a cause of action for lesion beyond 
moiety.”55
This dispute arose when Ms. Hornsby sold her 5/18ths undivided 
interest in 364 acres of immovable property in East Feliciana Parish to the 
                                                                                                            
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 609.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Id. at 607.
53. Id. 
54. Id.
55. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445.
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defendant Slade. Four years after the completion of the sale, Ms. Hornsby 
filed suit for rescission based on lesion beyond moiety.56
The parties stipulated that the purchase price of the property was 
$28,000.00, and the value of the raw land was between $26,750.00 and 
$37,387.60. The parties also stipulated that the value of the gravel itself 
would add $97,417.50 to the value of the land. Therefore, if the court 
allowed sand and gravel evidence (to the value of the raw land), the sale 
was lesionary. 57 The sale price of the tract of land amounted to a little less 
than one-fourth of the value of the gravel itself. Slade then filed a motion 
in limine to exclude appraisal information based on results of gravel 
testing and inspection reports made after the date of the sale. 
The district court found the sale subject to rescission for lesion. The 
district court opined that “the gravel constituted a solid mineral which was 
an inseparable component of the ground and, therefore, the data and 
information as to the gravel deposits could be used to determine the value 
of the land as of the date of the sale.”58 Slade appealed. A divided First 
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, determining that the “value 
of sand and gravel or solid mineral deposits in the land sold could be 
considered in determining fair market value of the land and, thus, subject 
the sale to [a] cause of action for lesion beyond moiety.”59
The majority focused on the distinction between incorporeal and 
corporeal immovables. It found that land with mineral deposits is
considered corporeal immovables, which are subject to lesion, while those 
mineral rights in the land are incorporeal immovables, which are not 
subject to lesion.60 This distinction is crucial to the determination and 
application of lesion. The court then turned to the distinction between solid 
minerals which are inseparable component parts of the ground, and non-
solid minerals, commonly referred to as fugacious minerals, which are in 
theory res nullius.61 Due to the free-flowing nature of fugacious minerals, 
                                                                                                            
56. At this time, the peremptive period for an action based on lesion was four 
years. Louisiana Civil Code article 2595 established a prescriptive period of four 
years for actions for the rescission of sales based on lesion beyond moiety. “Acts 
1993, No. 841, section 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1995, changed Article 2595 to provide a 
preemptive period of one year in actions for lesion.” Id. at 442 n.2.
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 445.
60. Id. at 446.
61. “Deposits of solid minerals are inseparable component parts of the 
ground, whereas fugacious minerals are in theory res nullius.” However, the right 
to possession belongs to the owner of the ground. The owner of the ground may 
segregate the mineral rights from the ownership of the land and either retain them 
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fugacious minerals are not considered owned by the landowner above, but 
this landowner is given the exclusive right to explore for, develop, and 
reduce to possession those fugitive minerals.62 The minerals here,
however, are solid minerals (sand and gravel), considered naturally owned 
by the landowner but insusceptible of ownership apart from the ground 
until reduced to possession.63 This distinction was not clearly referenced 
in accordance with the decision; however, these solid minerals must be 
treated the same as mineral interests for this article’s purposes since their 
ownership may not be transferred separately from ownership of the ground 
itself. 
Ms. Hornsby argued that sand and gravel are naturally corporeal solid 
minerals, and lesion only lies in cases of corporeal immovables, as distinguished 
from mineral rights that are classified as incorporeal immovables under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 470.64 Therefore, the value of the gravel and sand 
that lay beneath the land should be considered in the fair market value of the 
land, resulting in an inequitable sale subject to rescission.
Mr. Slade argued that it has been the doctrine of Louisiana that one 
does not own mineral interests until they are reduced to possession, but 
that one simply owns the right to produce those minerals beneath the 
land.65 Slade emphasized that there is “little or no intrinsic value” in the 
gravel and sand due to the “speculative nature” of minerals.66 When such 
minerals are “left in place, the sand and gravel add no extra value to the 
land,” and therefore an action for rescission based on lesion should be 
precluded, as is stated within Louisiana Mineral Code article 17.67 This 
argument resembles that of the Wilkins court.68
The court found Mr. Slade’s argument to be without merit and found
that the statutory schemes have distinguished (1) the classification of land 
                                                                                                            
himself or convey them to another person. Accordingly, rights in minerals may 
be regarded as separable component parts of the ownership of land. Mineral rights 
segregated from the ownership of land ordinarily take the form of the mineral 
servitude, a mineral lease, or a mineral royalty. YIANNOPOULOS, TREATISE, supra
note 6, at § 118, π. 276–277. “[R]es nullius, under the French law, the source of 
Louisiana’s occupancy law . . . refers specifically to such things as wild game and 
fish, which are originally without an owner.” Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 
605 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
62. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6 (1975). 
63. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:5 (1975). 
64. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445. 
65. Id. 
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Wilkins, 99 So. 607.
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with mineral deposits and (2) the classification of the alienation of 
component parts called mineral rights.69 The court held that the former are 
corporeal immovables subject to lesionary inquiry, and the latter are 
incorporeal immovables not subject to a lesionary inquiry.70 Therefore, 
“lands with known mineral deposits may be valued as an entity and the 
trial judge was correct in permitting that testimony.”71
Justice McClendon stated in a notable dissent that the provisions of 
the Mineral Code do apply and that the rescission based on lesion beyond 
moiety should not have been permitted.72 The dissenting opinion discussed
a major flaw in the majority’s argument: their failure to distinguish 
between the actual sand and gravel beneath the land that is a corporeal 
immovable, and the underlying mineral right, which is clearly an 
incorporeal immovable.73 This distinction is based on the idea that solid 
minerals are insusceptible of ownership apart from the land until reduced 
to possession.74 “Minerals in their natural state cannot be ‘owned’
separately from the land.”75
With ownership of the land, Ms. Hornsby also held ownership to the
minerals beneath the land. However, she is not able to transfer her 
ownership of those minerals separately from her ownership of the ground; 
the minerals are considered inherently connected to the ownership of the 
land itself and may not be conveyed and valued separately until reduced 
to possession and ownership as a movable.76 Therefore, “the unproduced 
minerals beneath the surface have little or no intrinsic value” apart from 
the land.77 Justice McClendon’s dissent focuses on the fact that the added 
value to the land comes from the right to explore, mine, or remove the 
minerals beneath it. Since “the added value of the land is based simply on 
the right to remove the gravel below the surface, the Mineral Code clearly 
applies,” precluding such an action under Mineral Code article 17.78
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C. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Properties (2009)
In 2009, the Western District of Louisiana weighed in on the issue 
when an oil and gas lessor brought an action in state court seeking 
rescission of a contract with the lessee; his initial claim was for fraud, and 
in the alternative, on the grounds of lesion beyond moiety.79 In 2007, Mr. 
Thomas and Pride Oil entered into a lease for oil, gas, and minerals.80 The
lease provided that Mr. Thomas would lease the property to Pride Oil for 
a term of three years in exchange for $100.00, royalties of 3/16 of the 
market value for oil and gas “produced and saved” from the land, and other 
valuable consideration.81
Mr. Thomas filed an action in state court thereafter to rescind the sale, 
alleging that “one of the largest natural gas deposits in the world” was 
located beneath the leased property and that “at the time of the lease [he] 
did not know of the existence of . . . deposits or of the[ir] extreme value.”82
Mr. Thomas stated that had he been aware of the valuable deposits below 
his land, he would never have agreed to the lease at that price.83 Following 
removal to federal court, the lessee filed a motion to dismiss.84 The district 
court granted the motion and held that the allegations were insufficient in 
several ways: to establish fraud, to state a claim that consideration paid 
was out of proportion to value received, and for mistake as to cause of the 
contract.85
The district court found that Mr. Thomas’s claim for rescission based 
on lesion beyond moiety warranted a finding of no cause of action.86 Citing 
Wilkins, the court discussed Louisiana’s long-standing rule that “a sale of 
mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the terms of the law 
which affords relief on the score of lesion; its inherent nature and character 
being such as not to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable 
value,” thereafter applying the same logic in the facts of Thomas.87
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D. Harruff v. King (2014)
In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of 
“whether Louisiana law allows for the inclusion of the speculative value 
of mineral interests or rights in and to immovable property in determining 
the fair market value of such property for the purpose of rescinding the 
sale of the property on the basis of lesion beyond moiety.”88
The plaintiffs, Harruff and Bildeau (hereafter referred to as “the 
Sisters”), were siblings and heirs of decedent Bobby Carlisle. Mr. Cason, 
also a plaintiff/appellee, was the subsequent purchaser of the property.89
The Sisters inherited an undivided interest in two tracts of land in 
Natchitoches and Red River Parishes.90 About one year after the 
inheritance, the Sisters sold their undivided interest in one of the two tracts 
of land to Defendants Richard King, Renee King, and Kyle King (hereafter 
referred to as “the Kings”).91 The sale included a cash sale deed 
transferring ownership interests in the property the Kings for $175,000.00, 
including the Sisters’ undivided interests in timber and minerals.92 Around 
six months after the King deal, the Sisters sold the Natchitoches tract to 
plaintiff Cason for $375,000.00, which was also a cash sale deed.93
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the sale of property the Kings
should be rescinded due to lesion beyond moiety.94
After a trial on the merits, the trial court granted a rescission of the 
sale based on lesion beyond moiety.95 The trial court cited Jones v. First 
National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court 
held that mineral interests or rights are to be included in the value of the 
property, so long as both the land and mineral interests are sold together.96
The trial court focused heavily on the “unsevered” nature of the minerals, 
and stated that:
The calculation of the value of the Property for purposes of lesion 
beyond moiety should include the value of the unsevered mineral 
rights as long as the transaction is not a transfer of mineral rights 
alone . . . Unsevered mineral interests, or mineral rights, are owned 
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as part of the ownership of the land and constitute a part of the 
corporeal immovable. If they increase the value of the land alone, 
they should be considered.97
The appellate court agreed with the reasoning pertaining to the 
“unsevered” nature of the mineral; however, instead of approaching the 
analysis similar to those courts before it, the court seemingly overlooked 
the issue of lesion applying to minerals and focused instead on the burden 
required by a rescission on the basis of lesion, effectively finding that the 
burden to prove the fair market value of the mineral interests in the property 
had not been met.98
In this step, the court made a crucial mistake: allowing lesion to apply 
to the sale of minerals and thereafter finding the obstacle that this allowance 
creates. The court recognized that the minerals were unsevered, and 
therefore, subject to no one’s ownership, but instead of drawing out this 
crucial factor, the court moved forward to establish a value of those 
minerals. This analysis overlooks the key determination of the speculative 
nature of minerals not reduced to possession. 
The court then turned to the testimony of the expert witness for the 
plaintiff, who failed to prove the fair market value of the mineral interests 
of the property at issue. The court appeared to stumble upon the problem at 
this point. The land and mineral expert was unable to produce evidence of 
the value of the minerals beneath the land. Therefore, since the landowner 
had not yet reduced the minerals to possession, there was no proof of their 
value; rather, there was merely “unsubstantiated assumptions and rank 
speculation.”99
It is important to note not only what the court did discuss, but also what 
the court failed to discuss, that being Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 and 
the Civil Code’s distinction between movables and immovables, corporeal 
and incorporeal. While recognizing the speculative nature of minerals 
beneath the land, the court took yet another approach towards the specific 
issue. This crucial error creates further bad precedent for the proper analysis 
for an action for lesion beyond moiety and moves away from the original 
intent of the Mineral Code’s preclusion for actions of lesion beyond moiety.
IV: WHAT SHOULD THE PROPER ANALYSIS LOOK LIKE?
The rulings in Wilkins, Hornsby, and Harruff come to differing 
conclusions and interpretations and take different paths in reaching them. 
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It is likely that these particular issues will arise again in the future, even 
more so with the recent discovery of the Haynesville Shale in Northwest 
Louisiana. The addressing court will be faced with the challenge of 
discerning between multiple indefinite and unsure approaches to a similar 
problem, each of which provides a different solution. It appears that both 
sides of the argument have valid precedent to support an argument both 
for lesion beyond moiety, and also against an action for lesion beyond 
moiety.
A. The Current Analytical Flaws in the Jurisprudence
Recalling Hornsby, the court held that solid minerals are integral parts 
of the land; therefore, a tract of land is more valuable when the value of 
those solid minerals beneath the surface are included.100 While this may 
be equitably and objectively true, this argument is weak because it
completely ignores the civilian distinction between corporeal immovables 
and incorporeal immovables. In addition to moving away from civilian 
application, the court ignores the legislatively created law precluding 
lesionary actions within the Mineral Code, effectively holding powerless 
law created by the legislature. This ruling creates a system of prejudice 
against purchasers, while favoring the seller in his pursuit of a win-win 
situation. It effectively places all chance of loss upon the purchaser and 
decreases the economic benefit of immovable sales and leases. 
The Thomas court ruled on the facts of a mineral lease, reiterating the 
Wilkins ruling that mineral rights are speculative in nature and that a sale of 
minerals may not be rescinded on the grounds of lesion beyond moiety.101
The court’s ruling is similar to the proposed solution that this article offers; 
however, clarification as to the difference between corporeals and 
incorporeals, and how this distinction applies in the aspect of minerals, 
mineral servitudes, and mineral leases, is necessary for clarity and punctuality.
The Harruff ruling further confused matters. It focused on the issue of 
the burden of proof in a cause of action for lesion beyond moiety, and 
simultaneously dodged the discussion of lesion’s application to minerals.102
While this ruling is the most recent voice of the Louisiana courts, it sets a
bad precedent for legal scholars, courts, and individuals bringing similar 
claims to understand the civilian principles involved in this cause of action. 
The analysis in this case is flawed, off point, and effectively convolutes the 
actual issues.
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For the just application of the law, clarification and clear application 
of these principles is required. A bright-line rule for the application of the 
law of minerals, mineral rights, and mineral leases in accordance with the 
cause of action for lesion is needed. A concise analytical framework must 
be set forth to establish both reliable guidance for the benefit of the courts 
and attorneys; such a framework should provide consistent results that 
may be relied upon in the future. 
Section D of this part provides a guideline for analyzing a cause of 
action for lesion pertaining to minerals. This framework makes clear: (1) 
the distinction between a corporeal immovable and an incorporeal 
immovable, (2) how this distinction affects the outcome and analysis of 
cases involving minerals and lesion, (3) the proper analysis for such an 
action, and (4) why the Mineral Code’s preclusion of lesion should apply. 
B. The Distinction: Corporeal and Incorporeal Immovables
Think back to Ms. Hornsby’s case.103 Ms. Hornsby’s previously 
owned tract of land is clearly a corporeal immovable; therefore it is subject 
to the Louisiana Civil Code article 2663’s claim for rescission on the 
grounds of lesion beyond moiety.104 There is a clear distinction between a 
corporeal immovable and those minerals beneath the immovable,105 with 
the latter being precluded from an action based on lesion under the Mineral 
Code’s article 17. 
Louisiana is one of the many states classified as a “non-ownership”
state.106 This means that while the ownership of land includes all minerals 
occurring naturally in their solid state, those minerals are insusceptible of 
ownership apart from the land until reduced to possession.107 The Wilkins
Court established this rule of law, finding that the original Louisiana Civil 
Code article 1862 for lesion “restricted the action of lesion to immovables 
. . . which are such by their nature and not such as are made immovable by 
disposition of law.”108 Such a disposition of law is clear from the Louisiana 
Legislature’s “Act 205 of 1938, which defined and classified mineral 
leases as real rights and as incorporeal immovable property.”109 The 
                                                                                                            
103. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d 441.
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2017).
105. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608 (1924).
106. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 99 (1966); Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (1922).
107. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:5, 31:7 (1975) (emphasis added).
108. Wilkins, 99 So. at 608; see also Yiannopoulos, Movables, supra note 39, 
at 518.
109. Yiannopoulos, Movables, supra note 39, at 551.
290 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
purpose of this Act “would seem . . . to classify mineral leases as real rights
and incorporeal immovables for all purposes.”110
At the time of the sale, Ms. Hornsby had yet to reduce any minerals 
from her land to possession. She was not even aware of the presence of 
minerals beneath her land until after the sale of the property.111 While she 
did own those solid minerals beneath her land according to Mineral Code 
article 5, those solid minerals could not be conveyed through the sale of 
the property because they had not yet been discovered and reduced to her 
possession. In this situation, the land (corporeal immovable) should be 
considered and valued distinct and separate from the value, if any, of the 
minerals beneath the land. 
In granting the rescission to Ms. Hornsby, the court implied 
recognition of this distinction by valuing the sand and gravel separately 
from the value of the land itself.112 The courts recognized this distinction 
in each of the previously mentioned cases, with each court struggling to 
apply a monetary value to subsurface minerals due to their “speculative”
and “unfixable” value.113 This determination is vital for maintaining the 
unified civilian system of law in Louisiana and following the intent and 
will of the legislative body. Recognizing that a tract of land and those 
minerals found beneath it are distinctly classified, the focus turns to how 
this distinction affects the analysis for a lesionary action.
C. Incorporeal Immovables Are Not Subject to Rescission Based on 
Lesion
Upon sale of any tract of land, the seller conveys ownership of the 
tract of land itself, including the attached real right to those minerals found 
beneath the surface of the land, to the purchaser. However, the purchaser 
does not convey “title of ownership to any specific thing, separate and 
[distinct] from the soil, but merely the right to drill, capture, and reduce to 
possession” any minerals that might be found beneath the surface.114 If 
minerals were included in the valuation of the land, the courts would be faced 
with valuing “an assumption of production which clearly illustrates . . . ‘the 
speculative nature of mineral exploration.’”115 Such a determination is 
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extremely difficult and highly susceptible to manipulation by the 
numerous factors that play into any evaluation, which has been shown 
clearly in Harruff.116
Ms. Hornsby’s undeveloped property was sold within the range of the 
appraised value.117 At the time of the sale, the value of this property was 
approximately $28,000.00.118 Any minerals beneath the property were
purely speculative due to their undeveloped and undiscovered nature, 
making a fixed value inherently indeterminable. Any value added to the 
tract of land “resulting from the sand and gravel in the land arises from the 
right to explore, mine, or remove these minerals.”119
Louisiana Civil Code article 2590 states that the immovable sold is 
evaluated according to the state in which it was at the time of the sale. 
Once discovered, “removed, and reduced to possession, the sand and 
gravel can then be valued subject to the law of movables.”120 Such an 
application follows this code article’s legislative intent that the evaluation 
should occur at the time of the sale. 
The Legislature’s enactment of the Mineral Code’s preclusion for 
lesion was with these circumstances in mind.121 Allowing rescission of 
such a sale would effectively reward zero risk on behalf of Ms. Hornsby, 
and whisk away the valued investment of the purchaser. This placement 
of risk on the investor/purchaser places an inequitable burden on the party, 
placing the selling party in the ultimate position to take advantage of the 
selling process. This inequity must not be permitted to continue, as the 
legislature has noted and which is the intent behind the Mineral Code’s
preclusion for lesion.
D. The Proper Analysis for an Action for Lesion Beyond Moiety 
Involving Minerals
The first issue the court should address when considering an action for 
lesion is whether the sale involved a corporeal immovable, an incorporeal 
immovable, or both. If the action discusses minerals, the sale included both 
a corporeal immovable and an incorporeal immovable. In the case that the 
sale included both a tract of land and considerations of the minerals 
thereunder, the court must then factually determine whether the seller and 
buyer were both cognizant of such minerals and their inclusion in the sale. 
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In that situation, the action must be dismissed due to the recognition, 
weighted value, and consideration of the minerals included within the sale. 
If neither the seller nor purchaser were made aware of minerals 
beneath the land at the time of the sale, the action would fall under the 
Louisiana Civil Code’s allowance for an action for lesion beyond moiety, 
assuming the immovable was sold at a value less than half of that which it 
is valued for.122 However, since minerals (incorporeal immovables) are 
involved, the action should be effectively precluded due to the preclusion of 
lesionary actions under Mineral Code article 17. Thus far, courts have failed 
to apply this simple methodology.
E. The Mineral Code’s Preclusion of Lesion Should Be Applied to All 
Such Actions as Pertaining to Minerals
For over ninety years, “it has been the law of Louisiana that a sale of 
mineral rights ‘cannot be regarded as . . . falling within the terms of the law 
which affords relief on the score of lesion; its inherent nature and character 
being such as not to be susceptible of having an intrinsic definite and fixable 
value.’”123 The incorporeal nature of mineral rights is too speculative to affect 
the valuation of the price of a tract of land.124 Upon purchase of land, both the 
buyer and the seller understand the value of everything above the surface. The 
seller is consciously committing to the sale of his land for a value that he 
believes the land is worth to him at the time of the act. Prior to and thereafter, 
“the price may be at the very lowest today . . . and reach the very peak of 
prices tomorrow, dependent on the production or nonproduction of oil and gas 
in the neighboring territory.” If courts allow the discovery of minerals 
subsequent to the sale of an immovable to provide for rescission of such sale, 
an inequitable shift would be applied to only the purchasing party. 
Lesion is considered “an instrument of public policy that, with certain 
limitations, allows the judicial policing of certain contracts that, because of 
unfairness that can be objectively shown, are inconsistent with the welfare 
of the community and therefore contrary to the public order.”125 Recall the 
situation Ms. Hornsby was in previously and consider the practical 
difference that the interpretation and application of the lesionary principles 
this article has discussed could mean for landowners.
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The law on sales of immovables, and sales in general, could be 
substantially altered if lesion is applied to minerals. For instance, unknowing 
landowners will have no incentive to survey and test their property before 
selling the land. Individual purchasers are investing their money in tracts of 
land, thereby burdening themselves with the risk against the prior owner’s
reward if minerals are later discovered that significantly raise the value of 
the land. Increased litigation over these disputes would substantially 
increase the court’s docket. Jury determinations of the value of certain 
minerals and if those values are adequate for the lesion article to apply 
would be considerably speculative and unpredictable. 
By not applying lesion to minerals, Louisiana would have a bright-line 
rule to follow, litigation would decline, and landowners will look to 
develop their own land and have the land’s value assessed prior to the sale 
or transfer of the land. Recognizing the fallacies of a possible draw-back 
on the economic trade of property, the policy-implicated scale appears to 
tilt in favor of not applying lesion to minerals. 
CONCLUSION
Returning to the hypothetical at the beginning of this article, does a 
cause of action exist against the purchaser of your land when minerals 
have been discovered beneath the land post-sale? Under the current 
jurisprudence of the state of Louisiana, perhaps. Under the correct 
application of the legislation and civilian system of Louisiana, however, 
no cause of action would exist. 
Courts should apply a hybrid approach drawn from the Wilkins 
majority opinion, the Hornsby dissenting opinion, and the Thomas court’s
discussion. This proposal provides a practical application that accurately 
portrays how the Mineral Code’s prohibition on lesion pertaining to 
mineral rights should be applied. If courts are to consider the right to 
produce minerals separately for the purposes of lesion, then as such, and 
as declared by the legislature, that right is to be considered an incorporeal 
immovable separately from the corporeal nature of the tract of land when
considered on the basis of rescission post-sale, being effectively precluded 
from such an action per the Mineral Code’s article 17.
While this approach may be inequitable on its face, the underlying 
principle is supported by just reasoning and policy. Minerals beneath a 
tract of land are inherently speculative with an unknown value until 
removed from therein. If courts place a value on inherently speculative 
minerals beneath the ground, an inequitable result will consistently occur. 
To upset a contract established with consideration on behalf of the seller 
who has used his or her personal judgment in valuing land, and a 
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speculative purchaser of the land taking a risk in purchasing undeveloped 
property, provides ill precedent for further interpretations. 
The Mineral Code’s preclusion should remain in effect. This 
preclusion should be rigidly applied to all rescission actions based on 
lesion beyond moiety that involve the speculative nature of minerals. 
Dakota S. Hawkins?
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